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PUBLIC TELEVISION AND THE "OUGHT"
OF PUBLIC POLICY*
SIDNEY S. ALEXANDER**
If, to please the people, we offer what
we ourselves disapprove, how can we
afterwards defend our work? Let us
raise a standard to which the wise
and honest can repair.
G e o r g e Washington,
Speech to the Constitu-
tional Convention of
1787
Will the American people find happiness in Public Television? Is
Public Television in the public interest? "This subject," I want to argue,
"is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that
faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be
presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold
its assent to the doctrine."'
By "Public Television," I refer specifically to the proposal, made by
the Carnegie Commission for Educational Television, to build with fed-
eral support a system of public broadcasting based upon our present edu-
cational television system.2 The proposed system would consist of 380 local
television stations, enough to bring at least one public television signal of
grade B quality to about 94 percent of the population of the United States,
and at least one of grade A quality to about 68 percent. While all stations
would produce material of local interest, many would also produce mate-
rial of regional and national interest as well. To make available to each
other programs of more than local interest, and to permit the broadcast of
programs produced for nationwide distribution, the stations would be inter-
connected by cable or microwave. The entire system would cost about 270
* This paper was among those commissioned jointly by Resources for the Future, Inc.
and the Brookings Institution, both of Washington, D.C., and served as the basis of dis-
cussion at a symposium held September 11 and 12, 1967, at Airlie House, Warrenton,
Virginia. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent those of the
trustees, officers, or staff of either sponsoring organization.
** Professor of Economics and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Consultant to The RAND Corporation.
I. Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 898
(E. Burtt ed. 1939).
2. Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, PuBLiC TELEVISON: A PROOAM
FOR ACTION (1967).
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million dollars a year. Of this total, some 54 million a year is to be spent
on the production of national programs for broadcast by local stations.
The commercial television system is under pressure to produce the most
popular programs that can be produced. The public television proposal
is made in the belief that a public television system, supported largely by
the government, but operating autonomously, would be motivated to pro-
duce the best programs that can be produced. The essential fact for this
paper is that the proposed public television system will require the use of
substantial resources for the production and distribution of television pro-
grams that are deemed by public officials to be the best for the American
people. The assertion that public television is in the public interest is there-
fore the assertion that it is in the public interest to devote some 270 million
dollars a year to provide the public with programs produced and distributed
by an independently operated, though publicly supported, television sys-
tem, whose policy is to produce and exhibit the best rather than the
most popular programs. Whether or not one can rationally assent to
that proposition raises the question-with which the next sections of this
paper are concerned-whether one can rationally assent to any normative
judgment. In the final section of this paper, I shall return to the examina-
tion of public television in the light of the conclusions on normative judg-
ments.
I. THE ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM AND TO THE SCIENTIST
Woe unto you, lawyersl for ye have
taken away the key of knowledge:
ye entered not in yourselves, and
them that were entering in ye hin-
dered. Luke 11: 52
The question I am raising in this paper is: what rational arguments
can be made in support of public television? Social scientists believe, as
a matter of faith, positivists as a matter of logic, that a normative ques-
tion is not subject to rational inquiry. Rationality is taken to be a matter
of means, not of ends, and to attempt to evaluate ends rationally is simply
to be confused. The social sciences, like the natural sciences, can at most
aspire to the discovery of that which is. That which ought to be cannot be
found with the most powerful of microscopes. How then can I assert a
public interest in public television?
The Carnegie Commission on Educational Television supported the
public television proposal in a manner completely different from those
today considered permissible. The difference remains large even if we allow
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for the fact that the report is addressed to the general public rather than
social scientists. The Commission took as a theme for one part of its re-
port, the views of E. B. White:
Noncommercial television should address itself to the ideal of
excellence, not the idea of acceptability-which is what keeps com-
mercial television from climbing the staircase. I think television should
be the visual counterpart of the literary essay, should arouse our
dreams, satisfy our hunger for beauty, take us on journeys, enable us
to participate in events, present great drama and music, explore the
sa and the sky and the woods and the hills. It should be our Lyceum,
our Chautauqua, our Minsky's, and our Camelot. It should restate
and clarify the social dilemma and the political pickle. Once in a
while it does, and you get a quick glimpse of its potential.
That excellence, and not acceptability, is to be the ideal directly chal-
lenges the standard of want satisfaction, or egoistic utilitarianism that un-
derlies the normative analysis of economists and political scientists. The
desired need not be the desirable. Even if people are willing to pay a lot
less for public television than it would cost, it may well be desirable. For
it may be that public television can help make better people of us, and
a better country for us. That could well be worth more than the things
we would otherwise buy with the $270,000,000 a year. That argument,
however, I shall defer until I am in a better position to make it. In the
meantime, I should like to build a basis for bringing this question, and
questions like it-questions of good or bad, desirable or not-into the range
of discourse of social scientists.
I claim that it is particularly suitable for those engaged in the study
of our social institutions to attend to the possibility of their improvement;
that the belief that there is in the social sciences no room for the normative
is an error; that that error is the root of much evil. It foists upon economics
and political science mistaken standards of the good, and closes the door
to inquiry into rival standards. The result is a conservative bias in the
social sciences, a bias that whatever exists is good, or at least, that there is no
possible basis for saying that a condition that does not exist is better than
the one that does.
The economist, in the face of a normative problem, has, in different
moods, three reactions. The first is to claim that notions of better or worse
are strictly personal.' When he suspends that tenet for purposes of public
3. Id. at 13.
4. Talk of ends is called ideology (the perjorative for other peoples' ideals), and an
ideological proposition treated in a logical manner, "dissolves into a completely meaning-
less noise or turns out to be ... circular.... Take the proposition: all men are created
equal . . . [A]re all men the same weight?" J. ROBINSON, EcoNoMIc PHILOSOPHY 2
(1964). But surely it is not meaningless to say that all men are created equal and few
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policy discussion, he still believes that any judgment of better or worse
can appropriately be made only as a function of incommensurate individual
preferences and so is led to Pareto optimality.' If he is very daring, he
assumes commensurability of utilities as measured by money, and under-
takes a cost-benefit analysis.6
These three forms of egoistic hedonism are all in violent opposition to
the notion of excellence, for that notion implies that some wants are better
than others, and indeed that what is not preferred may be better than
what is preferred. The issue is posed particularly sharply by Public Tele-
vision, since we already have commercial broadcasting, an institution that
can give the public just about what it wants, at least as far as the majority
is concerned, and even as far as very large minorities are concerned.
It is true that an economist can point out, as Wiles has, that program-
ming television solely on the basis of aggregate popularity might fall short
of the optimum that would be indicated by a cost-benefit analysis. Sup-
pose that there should be an intense desire on the part of a small minority
for cultural television programs, of which opera and the ballet are usually
given as prime examples. If given the opportunity they would, let us as-
sume, be willing to pay more for such programs than the viewers of the
displaced programs would be willing to pay for the difference between
their current program fare and the closest substitute to which they would
be shifted if opera and ballet were to replace what they are now watching.
Then a cost-benefit analysis would support, distribution considerations
aside, programming other than the most popular program. Essentially this
implies an interpersonal measure of utility.
The argument for excellence goes well beyond such cost-benefit analysis,
however. It claims that some programs are better than others; that the
could have misunderstood it as requiring anthropological measurement, though many
might differ over what that equality implies. That all men are created equal is a some-
what figurative expression of the normative truth that all men are rightly to be accorded
equal rights under the law. Far from being a meaningless noise, this is a truth that we
scorn at our peril.
5. We may consider one state of the world better than another if nobody concerned
prefers the second to the first, and at least one person prefers the first.
6. An economist will allow that a proposal like public television can be evaluated by
a cost-benefit comparison-whether potential viewers would be willing to pay for the
programs the total cost of providing them. If income distribution effects are not adverse,
the decision is then to be governed by whether the value of the benefits exceeds the
costs. Otherwise, if the distributional effects are adverse, the decision would have to be
made by an authorized policy maker referred to in the trade as "superman," who has to
decide whether the net excess of benefits over the costs outweighs the adverse distribu-
tional effects. I. LITTLE, A CRiTIQUE OF WELFARE ECoNoMICs 87 (1950). In the case
of British television policy, we have an actual sample of this sort of analysis skillfully ap-
plied. Wiles, Pilkington and the Theory of Value, 73 EcoN. J. 183-260 (1963).
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incentives of the present commercial arrangements in television work in
favor of the production of the most popular programs and against the pro-
duction of the best. If, however, a special organization were created for
the express purpose of producing the best programs that could be produced,
the programs so produced would be better than those that are now pro-
duced. Better programs, it is usually assumed rather than argued, would
be better for those who watched them.
A presupposition of this argument is that it is not meaningless to say
that one program is better than another, or that one experience of pro-
gram viewing is better than another, or that it is better to be one kind of
man than another. If we are to deal with these contentions, we need to
understand them and to determine their truth, both of which we are told,
are impossible to do.
Three reasons are offered for the impossibilities of these undertakings.
First, we are told that words like "should" and "better" are meaningless
noises. Second, even if some sort of meaning can be assigned a normative
sentence, it is still not capable of being true or false. Third, a normative
sentence is a device, not for stating something, but only for expressing per-
sonal approval or disapproval, based only on the speaker's conscience.
These three statements characterize respectively, semantic positivism, epis-
temological positivism, and personalism. To support the contention that
the proposition that public television is in the public interest can be ra-
tionally assessed, one must show these three viewpoints to be mistaken.
The mansion of philosophy that we must build to house the normative
has four levels. The first gives the least trouble. It is the level of a particu-
lar normative judgment, one that issues in a statement of the form "A
should be done," where A stands for some specified act. The principal
information required to support a particular normative judgment, given the
rest of the structure, is the positive fact that A has those empirically veri-
fiable characteristics that make it what should be done.
Only positive facts are usually required because there is presumably al-
ready at hand a judgment at the second, or universal normative, level of
the form "if anything has the positive characteristics of A and its conse-
quences in its context, it should be done." A universal normative judgment
expresses a normative commitment. In order to establish its truth, we have
to use whatever methods are appropriate for so doing, and those methods
are the concern of the third level, the epistemology of the normative. In
the first instance that subject deals with the methods appropriate for testing
the truth of a normative statement. Fundamentally, it concerns how we
find out what we are committed to. Whether a universal normative state-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ment is true or not then depends upon two things. First, it depends upon
the general values to which we are committed. Given our general sub-
stantive commitments, the determination of whether we are committed to
a given statement of a universal normative character depends upon what
that statement means, a matter of language. The fourth level is, accord-
ingly, that of meta-ethics, or the language of the normative.
These four levels together constitute an apparatus for exploring our
commitments, and our ways of judging how our commitments bear upon
a particular action that lies before us. In short, if I want to argue that
public television is a good thing, I find that I have to exhibit a language
in which that statement is meaningful, an epistemology that offers imper-
sonal conditions for the truth of such a statement, a set of ideals which
govern what is good, and a set of positive facts sufficient to show that pub-
lic television satisfies those ideals. It is my object to show that if this can
be done it can be done rationally.
II. NORMSPEAK
"When I use a word," Humpty
Dumpty said in rather a scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it
to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice,
"whether you can make words mean
so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty
Dumpty, "which is to be master-
that's all."
THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS
Our first task at the meta-ethical level of the language of the norma-
tive is to respond to the positivist's question: "What do you mean,
'should'?" by clarifying the meaning of normative terms. There is a great
deal to be clarified, so much indeed that some of the leading contemporary
moral philosophers regard the clarification of ethical language as the cen-
tral task of ethics. R. M. Hare, in an encyclopaedia article, refers to ethics
proper as dealing with the meanings of moral words or the nature of the
concepts to which these words refer." What I call ethics proper, the sub-
stantive study of what things should be done or what things are good, he
calls morality. Normative epistemology is not even given a separate name
7. Hare, Ethics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND
PHILOSOPHERS 341 (J. Urmson ed. 1960) (unsigned but acknowledged).
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by Hare, but in practice he regards it as part of the language of ethics, so
adding to the general confusion.
What then, is meant, in a given context by a sentence of the form: "A
should be done?""
As a starter, we may suggest that the expression means, "A is rightly
to be done." But the positivist will have as much trouble with rightly as
with should, and if we define rightly as appropriately, properly, etc., he
will be no less troubled. His difficulty, accordingly, lies with the normative
no matter what verbal form it takes. He understands what we are doing-
we are speaking from a viewpoint that it is right to do certain things and
not right to do others, or that it is better to do some things than others.
That is part of a way of life, and anyone who shares that kind of a way of
life can understand the general use of should, even though, his way of life
possibly being different from ours, he may think that different things should
be done. The positivist understands all this, so he really does understand the
meaning of the expression "A should be done" at least up to a semantic
level of meaning.
That a positivist can recognize that "A should be done" is a normative
expression immediately reveals that the expression is not semantically mean-
ingless. Given a set of semantically meaningless sounds, it is not possible
to clarify them as positive, normative, or anything else; they are just mean-
ingless sounds. To recognize a statement to be normative is to understand
it to refer, semantically, to something rightly to be done, or worthy of com-
mendation or condemnation, etc. That is to understand the normative at
the semantic level.
In order better to come to grips with our differences with the positivist,
we need to distinguish different levels of meaning and of the correlative
concepts of understanding and definition. We shall take it as agreed that
an expression may properly be said to be meaningful if it can be under-
stood, and the meaning of an expression is what we understand when we
understand it.
One meaning of "meaning" might then be "that which is given in a
definition," but just as we have to inquire into the meaning of meaning, we
must inquire into the concept of definition, and indeed, much of the con-
fusion in ethical theory for the past 60 years and possibly for the past 2500
years proceeds from confusion over the nature of definition. A great deal
8. This is a formula rather than a sentence, but here and in subsequent discussion we
will take it for granted that when we talk about a formula using "A" in this manner, we
are talking about the corresponding sentence to be formed by substituting for "A" the
name of a particular act.
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of modem philosophy, ranging far beyond ethics, has been generated in
the attempt to clarify that confusion as it occurred in ethics.
When a man asks for a definition, there are at least three different things
he may be asking for, which we may call a verbal equivalent, a specification,
or an explication, respectively. As the term "definition" is defined in logic
texts it is taken as a statement of symbolic equivalence.' A new symbol is
introduced, usually for the purpose of abbreviation, and is declared to be
equivalent to a certain arrangement of symbols already in use. The state-
ment declaring that equivalence is a definition. We may refer to this type
of definition as a verbal definition and use a subscript 1 to denote it in
any otherwise ambiguous case.
The definition1 of "A should be done" that I propose is then "A is
rightly to be done." This implies that the expressions "rightly" and "is to
be done" have previously been introduced, but not necessarily previously
defined. For any chain of definitions must end in a set of primitive terms.
This simple fact of the logic of a system of discourse is frequently ignored
by those who demand the impossible, that all terms be defined before they
are used. The most important terms of any subject must remain undefined
in the sense of definition.
Clearly, the positivist isn't interested in a definition1 of our normative
terms. If we give him one, he will have as much trouble with the definiens
as with the definiendum. We might just as well, then, take the terms rightly
and is to be done to be primitive in our system of normative discourse and
use the above definition1 for "A should be done."
The positivists and those close to them offer an alternative, emotivist,
definition1: "A should be done" means "I approve of A, do so as well."
The trouble with this emotivist concept of should is that it just doesn't do
the job we want it to do. If I say "A should be done" and you say, "You
mean you approve of doing A and want me to do so as well," I simply
reply, "No, that is not what I mean, though I do approve of doing A, and
think that you would do well to approve it also. What I mean is that A is
rightly to be done. The act and its consequences have those positive charac-
teristics that qualify it as the best thing to do under the circumstances. I
am not just venting my emotions. I am offering you a particular norma-
tive judgment based, first, on my positive judgment of the nature and con-
sequences of A, and second, on my universal normative judgment of what
sort of thing it is right to do. And that normative judgment is not a mat-
ter of preference but one of belief. It does not refer to my personal taste,
but to a standard to which I, rightly or wrongly, believe the wise and hon-
9. See A. CHURCH, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL Loorc 76 (1956).
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est can repair. I am making a public and not a private claim. If your
definition of 'should' were accepted, I would have to use other language to
say what I want to say, namely that A is rightly to be done, not because
I approve of it, but because it is right."
At this point the positivist asks if I believe, then, in absolute truth. My
answer is no, but the question is one of epistemology and not of language.
When I say A should be done, I am implicitly claiming that other reason-
able, moral men should agree with me-i.e., they would be right to agree
with me. I am, accordingly, taking on a heavy epistemological burden.
If I claim that something is the right thing to do, I must be able to justify
my claim. Under the emotivist interpretation, no justification is necessary-
I approve of what I approve. But under the interpretation I propose, a
normative judgment must be defended, for it claims interpersonal validity.
How that claim is to be defended is the subject of the epistemology of the
normative.
A second type of statement that might be wanted when a definition is
requested is what I call a specification, or definition. An example in the
field of policy is Bentham's principle of utility according to which A should
be done if it increases human happiness.
For the purpose of analysis of this principle, let us assume that we have
positive criteria, previously agreed upon, to test whether something in-
creases human happiness. On this assumption, Bentham's principle has
been held up as an example of the so-called naturalistic fallacy. The fal-
lacy, it is claimed, occurs in defining1 "A should be done" so as to mean
"A increases human happiness," then it can't be used to tell us that A is
to be done, nor that A is rightly to be done. It does not, then, give us any
of the normative force that "should be done" usually supplies. The ex-
pression simply ceases to be normative, and becomes strictly descriptive.
Therefore, it is claimed, Bentham committed the naturalistic fallacy, by
definingi "should be done" in positive terms, so robbing it of its normative
force.
Bentham, and most of the "naturalists" after him, can be acquitted of
the charge, however, if the principle of utility is interpreted as a specifica-
tion, or definition2, instead of a statement of verbal equivalence, or defini-
tion,. A specification is to be taken as a statement of life rather than of
language or logic, something that we find or judge, rather than something
that we arbitrarily define as a symbolic equivalence. That Bentham ac-
tually meant his utilitarian principle as a specification is completely clear
from his defense of it. If he meant it to be a statement of verbal equivalence,
a definition,, he could have defended it merely by saying, "That is the very
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
meaning of the term 'should be done.'" But that was not his defense. He
defended the principle by challenging the reader to judge whether in de-
ciding whether something should be done or not, he did not actually use the
principle of utility.10
The widespread belief that Bentham adopted his utilitarian principle
as a definition1 is unfounded and completely contrary to the spirit of Bent-
ham's approach. This point is stressed, not just to set the history straight,
but because we have something to learn from the distinction between a defi-
nition,, a verbal equivalence, and a specification, or definition2, a substan-
tive statement which can be true or false, depending on the way the world
is, or what our commitments are. A definition1 is an arbitrary act of lan-
guage, while a definition 2, which we really shouldn't call a definition at
all, but something else, say a specification, is a statement of a normative
or positive judgment. It is perfectly proper to specify a normative concept
in terms of descriptive characteristics, if what we are trying to do is to ex-
press a normative commitment. In the particular example given, the nor-
mative commitment is to utilitarianism, the use of the happiness of those
affected as the test of the rightness of an action.
Similarly, when the inquiry in The Republic was characterized as a
search for the definition of the good, what was sought was hardly a verbal
equivalent. The argument of The Republic clearly reveals, just as did
Bentham's defense of the principle of utility, that what is sought is a speci-
fication, and not a definition in the logical sense. The inquiry is called
definitional because the findings can be summarized in a statement that
looks like a definition, but can sensibly be interpreted as a definition2, a
specification.
Similarly, when we are told by Schubert that the trouble with the con-
cept of the public interest is that it is not, or cannot be, defined operation-
ally, the complaint is not of the lack of verbal equivalents which are ready
to hand, but of the lack of a suitable specification of the public interest in
operational terms.'1 If we take Schubert's term "definition" to mean a
definition,, his complaint is an invitation to commit the naturalistic fal-
lacy. For "the public interest" is a normative term, and he would then be
complaining that there is no positive verbal equivalent of a normative
term. If we take his "definition" to mean a definition2, he is then asserting
a positivist epistemological principle which I shall later challenge.
There is a third thing that might be wanted when a definition is de-
manded. That is the meaning of the expression in question. It is not easy
10. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS PROM BACON TO MILL 794 (E. Burtt ed. 1939).
11. G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1960).
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to give the meaning of an expression, but what I call an explication or
definition3 , may be offered in the attempt. An explication consists of a dis-
cursive description of the use of the term, consistent with the slogan of the
ordinary language philosophers: "Don't ask for the meaning-ask for the
use."
Normative language is used to say that something is to be done because
something else is the case. The term should is used in recommending action
in a context in which we have reasons for doing things, and the expression
"A should be done" usually refers to such reasons implicitly, although it
does not explicitly state what they are. In a context in which there is no
particular reason for doing one thing rather than another, the notion of
should has no application.
While "should" usually implies that there are reasons for doing the act
in question, there is a sort of terminal or ultimate use of "should" in a con-
text in which there is no question of giving further reasons. Thus, if we
say "public policy should be directed toward increasing human welfare"
or "all men should be given equal consideration in normative judgments"
it is hard to think of any further reasons for these judgments but, rather,
these are the ideals that furnish the reasons for other normative judgments.
The use of "should" in such statements indicates, then, that it is not pri-
marily used to give a reason, but to point out what is rightly to be done.
The notion of should is, in a certain sense, logically prior to the notion of
a reason. A reason becomes a reason because something should be done on
its account. While the commonest use of "should" is in a context where rea-
sons are taken to govern what is to be done, "should" is used to set up the
reasons as well as to refer to them. More neutrally expressed, if we believe
that certain things are to be done if they have certain characteristics, then
the expression "A should be done" is used to state that A has those charac-
teristics that qualify it as what is rightly to be done.
It may accordingly be recognized that a normative term in general, and
"should" in particular, faces two ways." That is its function. It has a
normative aspect, from which it may be understood to say that something is
rightly to be done. That normative aspect, by a principle somewhat pre-
tentiously called universalization, contextually implies a positive aspect,
namely, that A has those characteristics which qualify it for being the right
thing to do.
If you are told that this is a good apple, you can infer many positive
features of the apple: that it is ripe, juicy, has the sort of flavor that most
12. This "Janus principle" has been emphasized in P. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS
(1954).
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people like, is larger than a certain minimum size, and is free of worms
and other imperfections. In this way, normative terms take on descriptive
meaning in the contexts of their use. We use the word "good" to commend
something, and if I hear you say that something is good, but I don't know
what that something is, I know only that you are claiming for it those (to
me unknown) properties which constitute excellence in a thing of its kind.
This is the primary meaning of "good." But if I know that it is an apple
you are calling good, and if I know anything at all about apples and what
is generally found to be commendable in apples, then I know a good deal
about the positive characteristics you are ascribing to the apple.
In its everyday use, normative language accordingly carries a heavy load
of derivative positive meaning. It is this fact which has led, and I think
misled, the instrumentalists, Dewey and his followers, to insist that norma-
tive expressions are empirical. They are right in the sense that in a typical
problematic situation the question, "is this a good apple or isn't it" is a
request for empirical information, because we are operating with accepted
standards of quality. Indeed, as an empirical generalization we may observe
that most normative issues center on the empirical considerations involved,
so that the question, "Should A be done?" usually poses the empirical ques-
*tion, what are the consequences of A? The relevant norms are usually
clearly enough recognized so that whether A should be done depends only
on the empirical facts.
The instrumentalists, then, have their point. From a practical viewpoint,
most normative problems are empirical. But that does not mean that a
normative statement is an empirical one. Quite the contrary. A normative
statement does not report on a positive state of the world; it says that some-
thing is worthy of being done. When viewed from what the statement says,
the normative aspect is the most important. When viewed from the grounds
for saying it, the positive aspect is usually what is at issue. Thus, when you
tell me this is a good apple, the important information you are giving me
is that it is an apple worthy of commendation and presumably suitable for
eating. The information which you have to have in order to justify that
judgment is empirical. So the controversy over whether normative state-
ments are empirical or not may be resolved in that they do indeed contextu-
ally imply empirical criteria, but these empirical criteria are implied as the
basis of rightful action rather than conveyed as description for its own sake.
Along these lines there have been centuries of confusion.
While, then, a normative term may be thought of as being primarily
normative, it will usually have, in use, positive implications. Some even go
so far as to consider both as parts of the meaning of the term, though it
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seems better to me to consider the normative aspect the meaning of the
term, while the criteria of appropriate application are to be determined as
a judgment of life and not of lexicography, and so are not part of the
meaning. A specification of a normative term can then be understood as at-
taching the normative force of the term to certain positive criteria. If we say
a good apple is one that is ripe and juicy and has a flavor of a certain sort,
we are affirming the commitment that this is the set of positive characteris-
tics that make an apple worthy of commendation. A commitment is in-
volved because we have already made semantic and behavioral commit-
ments to the commendatory aspect of "good." In applying the term to an
apple, we are recommending to someone that he would be wise to prefer
this apple to one which was not good. The term "good" is, accordingly,
empirical only relative to what has been found to be commendable in the
given context, and its primary meaning is given by its use in commending.
I will spare you further details of how should and good are used-you
all know how to use them. It suffices to say that they are used in the very
activity for which we want to use them-the recommendation of policy.
And as so used, "A should be done," or "A is the best thing to do," means
that A is rightly to be done.
The above discussion of the use of good and should, will I hope, serve
double duty, explicitly as an example of definition3 or explication of the
normative, and implicitly as an explication of "explication."
As previously noted, the positivist has no trouble understanding our
various definitions,, statements of verbal equivalence; he could have offered
them himself. And he was familiar with the general structure of usage
referred to in definition3, the explication. His problem lies with definition2,
a statement citing a normative commitment, in that he believes it is not
possible meaningfully to specify an operational criterion of a normative
expression.
The positivist's difficulty with the normative is encountered at two
levels--the semantic and the epistemological, respectively. At the semantic
level the complaint is that while "the cat is on the mat" has a very definite
referent which can be pictured as a cat on a mat, there is no corresponding
picture for the alleged pseudo-statement "the cat should be on the mat."
Lacking a referent it cannot be either true or false. For if the cat is not on
the mat, the statement "the cat is on the mat" is false, but whether the cat
is on the mat or not surely does not affect the truth of the pseudo-statement
that the cat should be on the mat.
The answer to the positivist semantic argument is that to be understand-
able is to be meaningful, and there are ways of understanding other than
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by picturing a referent. We may, following R. M. Hare, 3 distinguish two
components of the meanings of the two sentences quoted in the preceding
paragraph, which may be called, in terminology different from his, the
referential component and the assertorial component, respectively. The two
sentences have a common referential component, cat on mat, while their
assertorial components are different, being respectively, is and should be.
Consequently, the same referent or picture, that of cat on mat, will serve
for both sentences. They differ in what they assert about the referent.
Many other sentences, such as "the cat will be on the mat," or "it is odd
for the cat to be on the mat," could have the same picture as referent, while
asserting different things about that referent. Since we are willing to ac-
cept, with the positivist, the picture as the referent, any difficulty that re-
mains must be with the assertorial component. That we can understand the
whole meaning, including the assertorial component, derives from our
understanding of the activities of describing, prescribing, recommending,
commending, being puzzled, etc., for to each of these activities there cor-
responds an appropriate form of assertion. And if we understand these
activities, we can understand the corresponding assertions.
If we wanted to picture the assertorial as well as the referential com-
ponents of various statements about the cat on the mat, we should need,
in addition to the picture of the cat on the mat, a deck of pictures showing
the speaker engaged in various linguistic performances. Figurative imagina-
tion is required to convey the assertorial force of a statement by a picture,
but it could be done once the convention was recognized. Thus, the speaker
might be pictured as pointing at the referent picture in order to illustrate
the "is" of description, looking into a crystal ball for the "will be" of predic-
tion, wearing a halo for the "should be" of the normative or recommenda-
tion, a pleased expression for the "is good" of commendation. By means of
the assertorial a linguistic performance is accomplished, and we might, at
least figuratively, identify each performance by a suitably chosen pictorial
convention. But we find it more convenient to use verbs.
We need not, accordingly, share the positivist's semantic difficulties with
the normative. His epistemological difficulties are more serious, however.
But what we learned from dealing with the semantic difficulty does not
leave the epistemological issue where it was. Different assertions may require
different verifications. The appropriate way of finding out whether the
cat should be on the mat, or whether it is odd for the cat to be on the mat,
may differ in some essential respects from the appropriate way of finding
out whether the cat is on the mat. And in his epistemology, the positivist
13. R. HARE, TuE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952).
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claims that there is one and only one right way of verifying statements that
are not analytically true, and that is operationally. Once we note that
operational verification is by its nature confined to the verification of posi-
tive, descriptive statements, we need not be inclined to seek operational
verification of sentences which make other than descriptive assertions. So
the epistemological challenge to the normative is at last clearly posed: is
there an appropriate mode of verification of a normative statement? With-
out such a mode of verification, what sense is to be made of a normative
statement?
III. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE NORMATIVE
Before I encountered Zen, I thought
a river was only a river and a moun-
tain was only a mountain.
As I studied Zen I came to realize
that a river is not only a river and
a mountain is not only a mountain.
But, now that I have mastered Zen,
I know that a river is only a river
and a mountain is only a mountain.
Zen Mondo
If I say "A should be done," meaning that A is rightly to be done, not
as my personal judgment but as a judgment that is claimed to be right for
any reasonable moral person, how can I know whether I have spoken truly?
When faced with similar problems in positive inquiry, we can fall back on
the power to predict, with some help from the principle of Occam's razor.
But in normative inquiry we do not have that line of defense, although the
power to achieve the good life might play a role in the normative compara-
ble to that of prediction in the positive. But we are in much better agree-
ment over what it is to predict successfully than over what constitutes the
good life. It is here that the positivist charge that we do not know what we
are talking about when we speak normatively comes closest to the mark.
We must now take up the positivist's challenges by ihowing how to deter-
mine the truth of statements to which the empirical verification principle
does not apply.
Positivism starts out from the presumably self-evident normative principle
that we should not believe that which we cannot operationally verify. Our
rejection of positivism proceeds from a contrary belief. If the positivist's
belief is dogma, our contrary belief must be counter-dogma. We should be-
lieve some things that cannot be operationally verified. It is not easy to
furnish a reason for so fundamental a belief, but it may help to consider
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that we do, and must, believe things that are not operationally verifiable.
Some of us, if we are positivists, even believe that we should believe only
what can be operationally verified, which is, of course, a belief that cannot
be operationally verified. Since we do believe such things as that human
institutions should serve human welfare, or that it is evil to inflict unneces-
sary pain on another man, or indeed on any sentient being, then we must
inquire whether those principles are worthy of belief, or in a word, true.
The only basis we have for making that judgment is another belief for
which there is no operational verification. So, we find that we are bound,
not by logic but by life, to believe many things we cannot verify empirically.
How shall we judge which of these things are worthy of belief?
Our answer is simply that we have our ways. That may disappoint you,
but it is a lot better than if we had no way, or if I had my way and you had
your way, as the positivists claim. The question still remains whether the
ways that we have are any good. Are they valid? That normative question,
how is it to be answered? Once again we must content ourselves with the
rather lame reply that we have our second-level ways of judging whether
those other first-level ways of judging the truth of a normative statement
are good and valid.
By now the pattern should be clear. If, with respect to the second-level
ways of judging we ask how we can tell whether they are good or bad, we
can answer that we have our ways of making a third-level judgment. As
Spinoza put it, and others since, thinking is the only test for thought.
What are these ways we have of judging non-operational truth? Is there
any name for them? We may call them the methods of reason, of rational
inquiry, or of reasonable judgment. The operation of these methods is best
illustrated by the Socratic dialectic. Given a question before us, we con-
sider the interaction of our normative and positive beliefs bearing on the
question. Our first considerations reveal what additional positive facts or
normative principles we need to deal with the question. Each missing
piece, each issue of fact or of norm, becomes a question in its own right,
to be dealt with in the same manner, in a sort of open spiral.
If this process of inquiry were to be described as collating our positive
and our normative beliefs that together will settle the question before us,
the description would fail to catch the sense of exploration, discovery and
creation characteristic of the process. It isn't as if we had, at any time, a
clearly recorded set of beliefs, so that determining our belief on a particular
question was merely a matter of data retrieval. We don't have a huge book
of beliefs, with each inscribed on the proper line. What we have rather
is a certain predisposition at any time to generate and modify beliefs out of
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the state of our selves, or should we say our souls or our intellects. This
process of the Socratic dialectic may not seem very satisfactory as compared
with the procedures of natural scientists in their white jackets, but it is still
the best we have for this purpose, and very much better than the alternative
of nihilism or personalism which is usually offered in its stead.
We do well, as C. S. Peirce has said, to proceed from where we are,
and we are someplace. Or, to use a figure of Neurath's frequently quoted
by Quine, we are like sailors who must rebuild our boat as we sail in it.
We are prepared, upon inquiry, to believe certain things, including our
principles for testing and modifying those beliefs. All these belief potentiali-
ties may be thought of as constituting a system of beliefs provided the word
system is not taken so seriously as to imply consistency or order. To call
them a heap or a jumble of belief possibilities might be a better figure of
speech.
There are a number of our beliefs which appear, upon inquiry, to be
self-evident, not in the profound sense that no reasonable man can deny
them, for many would, but simply that we do believe them and have no
further evidence for them other than that we have come to believe them.
The classic example of such a self-evident belief is our belief in equal con-
sideration for all men in valid normative judgments, or in brief, our belief
in equality. To those who say that such a belief is incapable of being true
or false, we can reply that they are using an unsuitable standard of capa-
bility of being true or false, namely amenability to empirical verification,
and this is a normative and not an empirical belief.
This mysterious capability of being true or false does not, upon examina-
tion, come to very much. We need not stand appalled at the depth of
Pilate's question. In fact, we don't have to work with the concept of truth
at all, although we may, for convenience, continue to use it. We may
simply use the adjective "true," but not the noun "truth." What we need
to know is not what truth is, but what statements are true, and that is a
much more humdrum question. It is a question to be answered in each
context according to the standards appropriate to that context. We use the
word "true" to claim that statements which we believe are worthy of belief,
and we use "truth" to impute a common abstract quality to all true state-
ments. Our belief in a statement does not constitute its truth, it does not
make it true, although we sometimes say that we believe it because it is true.
That's hardly a proper use of "because" in that there is no substantial differ-
ence between our believing the statement and our judging it to be true, or
worthy of belief. That we do believe it leads us to call it true. What would
make it really true? Nothing more than that which would justify our belief
in it.
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This manner of speaking permits us to state our beliefs while still allow-
ing for the possibility that we may be wrong. We ascribe to those things we
believe the character of truth, but should we find one of them to be no
longer worthy of belief we can say "we believed it, but it wasn't true." We
even use the word "know" if our belief is strong enough, though that is an
especially odd verb, to be conjugated, "I know, you believe, he believes."
We can, accordingly, quite properly speak of a normative sentence as
being true if we really believe it to be worthy of belief. For a sentence to be
a statement, namely to be capable of being true or false, requires nothing
more than our willingness to consider it eligible for being worthy or un-
worthy of belief.
If, for example, we regard the principle that all men should be given
equal consideration under the law as something that some men can believe,
we can then appropriately speak of it as being true or false. To say that
it is true is to say more than that we believe it, for it implies that it is worthy
of belief. It is some sort of inconsistency to say "I believe that all men
should be given equal consideration, but the sentence 'all men should be
given equal consideration' is not capable of being true or false." Since we
do believe some such normative principles, we might as well grant their
capability of being true or false, worthy or unworthy of belief.
What then, is to be the test of a normative truth? How are normative
statements that are worthy of belief to be distinguished from those that are
not? This is a question of life rather than of language, since what we should
actually do is specified by the set of true statements involving "should." It
is sometimes suggested as an answer, that we must each one of us consult
his own conscience. But that is no answer, just a restatement of the prob-
lem, since conscience is merely the name, in the jargon of an antiquated
theory of human faculties, for the process we are investigating.
How then are we to judge what we should do? The three principal
modes of ethical judgment recently proffered are, respectively, the intui-
tionist, the decisionist, and one that I shall call the neopragmaicY4
The intuitionists are impressed by the apparently inescapable self-evi-
dence of our basic normative beliefs. They accordingly argue that, upon
careful examination of the case we just see that one thing is good and
another bad, one thing obligatory and another immoral. If someone dis-
agrees, we can only request him to look once again, being sure to view the
matter cooly, clearly and free of bias. The intuitionists usually regard good-
ness and badness as somehow inherent in the nature of things and not rela-
14. The discussion of these three ethical viewpoints draws heavily on D. POLE, CoN-
DITiONS OF RATIoNAL INQUIRY (1961).
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tive to human interests. This, said Santayana, was like claiming that
whiskey stands dead drunk in the bottle, an image that Bertrand Russell
admitted, divorced him from the intuitionist point of view, though one may
suspect that he was already ripe for the separation."
On the wave of positivism and its aftermath came the decisionist theory
of ethical judgment. The decisionists said that normative standards are not
found in nature but are conventional, matters for human decision. 6 An
operational test of that proposition seems hard to frame however. Even if
we accept it as a fact that standards are not found in nature, it does not
necessarily follow that our normative principles are matters for decision.
We have them, it is true, not from nature it is agreed, but need we have
decided to have them in order to have them? We may have come to have
them by a process other than decision. Furthermore, it is not a question of
how we came to have them, for to rest their truth or falsehood on their
genesis would be to commit the famous genetic fallacy, which consists of
using the way a man came upon a belief as a test of its validity. We may
stumble upon a truth in all sorts of odd ways.
I suggest, after David Pole and the neo-pragmatists, that we call that
faculty by which we adopt and reconsider our norms simply by the name
of judgment. The process by which we form and reform our norms through
rational consideration might appropriately be called rational inquiry, or the
dialectic. "Reason" may then be used to denote the methods we have, and
regard as the right methods, for making that sort of inquiry we call rational.
To eliminate circularity of terminology, we may say that we have certain
methods of inquiry which we have come to regard as appropriate for cer-
tain questions, and we have certain methods of evaluating those methods
of inquiry in turn. These ways of proceeding we may call rational methods
of inquiry. It would indeed be better if we were entirely to abandon this
faculty language that assigns certain of our ways of doing things to reason,
others to will, others to judgment and so on. If we do so, we merely come
to recognize that we do things in certain ways, most of them without know-
ing how we do them. 7
At first sight it might seem that there is little to choose between judgment,
on the one hand, or intuition or decision on the other, as the basis of recog-
nition of our norms. But there are, in my opinion, the strongest reasons for
preferring judgment. The trouble with both intuition and decision is that
15. Santayana, Winds of Doctrine, in W. SELLARS & J. HOSPERS, READINGS IN ETHI-
CAL THEORY 257 (1952).
16. K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES ch. 5 (1950).
17. See M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958) for a discussion of the nature
of our tacit knowledge.
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they yield results which are incorrigible and indisputable, and what we need
most in normative judgments is the possibility of correction and discussion.
If Brown intuits that A should be done, and Jones intuits that B should be
done, both having looked at the same complete set of positive facts, that
would seem to be the end of it. They just see things differently, as we say.
Similarly, if, under the same circumstances, Brown decides that A is to be
done and Jones, B, with no particular grounds for either decision other than
each man's will, there is nothing further to be done. But if Brown judges
that A should be done, and Smith judges otherwise, there is just that room
for argument that we need. The method of inquiry appropriate to intuition
is to look and see; to decision it is to look and decide; to judgment it is to
look and discuss.
The intuitive interpretation regards the normative judgment as the out-
come of a human constitution, partly congenital and partly imposed by
previous experience of culture and personal history. There is no reason,
however, why men should then agree in their intuitions, and yet each is to
take his intuition as infallible. The intuitionists do assume, as a matter of.
empirical fact, that men will intuit similarly, even though there seems to be
much evidence to the contrary.
Those who base norms on decision need not be fazed by any failure of
different men to agree, for why should they? The weakness in their posi-
tion, however, is what value or importance should we attach to decisions
so arbitrarily made? If there is some reason for deciding, then we are no
longer grounding the normative judgment on a decision, but rather on the
reason for the decision. But that is not the way the decisionists have pro-
posed decision as the basis for normative judgment. Their argument runs
to the effect that there are no standards in nature, so normative judgments
are conventional, and conventions are matters of decision, possibly not
arbitrary decision, but decision nonetheless. 8 It is not usually made clear
what saves these decisions from being arbitrary. Hare who most conspicu-
ously, along with Popper, adopted this decisionist point of view (though
he may not have stuck to it), claimed that if the decision is made in con-
templation of an entire way of life, it is anything but arbitrary since it has,
by assumption, taken into account all the considerations that can be taken
into account.' A man must decide how he wants to live, and the way of
life which he chooses will imply, as a corollary, whether any particular thing
should be done or not.
An arbitrary decision is not rendered less arbitrary by governing a whole
18. K. POPPER, supra note 16.
19. R. HARE, supra note 13, at 69.
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way of life rather than a single act. A judge in a law suit who examines
the facts ever so comprehensively can still decide the case arbitrarily if he
decides by his will and not according to the law. What saves a judgment
from being arbitrary is its being in accordance with some rightful principle.
If then I simply decide between two ways of life, without any further basis
than my own willful preference, it is an arbitrary decision, even if, accord-
ing to Hare's assumption, I have considered the alternatives in the most
complete detail. For if the decision is of that sort, I need not be concerned
with defending it, and it would have validity only for me.
But, in the normative, we are judging for all reasonable, moral men, and
I am accordingly bound to judge in the way that a reasonable, moral man
should judge. We claim interpersonal validity for our judgment, and we
must then conform that judgment to those standards that can reasonably be
applied to judgments claimed to be impersonal by a man claiming to be
reasonable and moral. These claims entail responsibilities. Our language
of the normative commits us to judge impersonally. We have our standards
for the methods of impersonal judgment. If we have sincerely applied those
standards we are subjectively justified in offering the resulting judgment
impersonally. Whether we are objectively justified is a judgment for a third
party to make using methods he is subjectively justified in making. Whether
his judgment is objectively justified is for a fourth party to judge, etc.
As we proceed with normative inquiry, we try to make normative judg-
ments impersonally, basing them on those of our commitments which are
ours not as personal taste, but in our capacities as reasonable moral men.
We must be prepared then to work for a convergence of our normative
views with those of other reasonable moral men.
We have now reached a critical point in our reply to the positivist where
his thrust was deepest. We did not need to worry about his claim that the
normative was non-referential, for we could establish the role of the as-
sertorial alongside the referential. We are concerned, however, to meet his
contention that there is no basis for impersonality in normative judgments.
The claim of impersonality, I am maintaining, is justified if the judgment
is actually made in an impersonal way. That does not mean that it is made
in such a way that all men will agree with it, for there is no such way. It
must, however, be made in such a way that all reasonable, moral men
should agree with it. As such, a normative statement is addressed to other
men who share not only our language and our standards of natural scientific
inquiry, but also some of our moral beliefs. If then comes one Hitler and
says, not equality of human dignity but the supremacy of the German
people is to be the basis of social institutions, I cannot convince him he is
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wrong, and I would waste my time addressing my normative statements
to him, but I know what to think of him as he knows what to think of me.
And my normative language is, indeed, addressed, as Murphy frequently
put it, to whom it may concern.2"
What I mean by judgment is no more nor less than the faculty which
you are exercising as you listen to me now. I am calling to your attention
considerations which support a viewpoint from which it will be appropriate
to make interpersonally valid normative statements. You are taking these
considerations into account and collating them with your beliefs in the very
process I am talking about. I am not proposing that you make, out of this
process, an empirical inference or a strict logical deduction, but I do hope
that it will lead you to a viewpoint from which you will be prepared to
make a judgment which agrees with mine. I expect this because I do not
believe that there is anything particularly personal in the judgment I have
made, but rather that I have come to it from a position which I think you
share, using methods which I think you are prepared to use. It is that
notion of the convergence of views and viewpoints that come out of rational
inquiry that is the basic concept I am trying to present.
Sometimes to avoid the rather harsh claim of intuitive self-evidence, we
use the somewhat gentler term "natural" to describe those of our beliefs for
which we do not have further evidence, but which we judge to be worthy
of acceptance. For example, Arrow, in proposing the conditions that a
system of voting could reasonably be required to satisfy, if only they weren't
contradictory, calls them "natural" conditions.2 So we may say of the
condition that all men should be given equal consideration, it is a natural
one to impose. For most of the millennia man has been on earth this prin-
ciple of equality was found to be anything but natural. Only within the
past two or three centuries has it come to be judged as natural or intuited
as self-evident.
We may use the words reasonable or natural to describe both the methods
which we have come to judge appropriate for the conduct of normative
inquiry, and the findings of that inquiry. Thus the utilitarians start from
the recognition that the natural reason to give for doing something is that
you enjoy doing it. They may even claim that it is a natural step from that
to say that a social arrangement is justified if people are, on some net
balance, suitably determined, happier under that arrangement than under
any available alternative. So too we may come to regard the demands of
20. A. MURPHY, THE USES OF REASON (1943); A. MURPHY, THE THEORY OF
PRACTICAL REASON (1965).
21. K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2 (1951).
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justice as in some way natural. The psychologists may be able to explain
what sort of unnatural conditioning has led us to hold that these are natural
viewpoints, but such explanations do not concern us here.
What does concern us is that we do hold these viewpoints, whether they
are natural or not. We hold them jointly, so we can, in our joint inquiry
into what we should do, use these jointly-held viewpoints as fulcrums on
which to rest our levers. Where we differ we may seek for some common
ground to start our inquiry as to whether we can resolve the difference.
The presupposition which makes sense of the impersonality of the norma-
tive is that each of us is trying to apply a standard that is not conditioned
upon his own temperament or the accidents of his personality or his personal
history but is valid for all men who are reasonable and moral. We may
grant, as a matter of psychology, that we are biased by our culture, by our
personalities and our experience, but however biased we may be, we are
still trying the best we can to form an unbiased judgment. Our discourse
and our mode of inquiry must be fitted to that purpose.
That we can presuppose a tendency toward agreement as a consequence
of our joint attempt to judge policy questions not from our personal points
of view, but from the impersonal point of view of a reasonable moral man,
comes close to a doctrine of truth propounded by Charles S. Peirce. He
held that "human opinion universally tends in the long run to a definite
form, which is the truth."2 While he had in mind opinion on descriptive
matters, the doctrine applies as well to the normative.
Suppose it to be true, as Peirce maintained, that human opinion, even
of the normative, tends to converge in the long run. This, if it is true, is a
descriptive fact. How can we derive from it a normative conclusion that
the judgment toward which opinion converges is worthy of acceptance?
Would this not be another example of the naturalistic fallacy? We can
accept the convergence as pointing toward the truth only because we have
already made the normative judgment that we should accept what reason-
able men would come to accept-that we should follow the argument.
The process of inquiry is central in neo-pragmatic thought.
Possibly there might be different lines of convergence, each starting
from a different initial position. One might lead to a race of pigs, one to a
race of tigers, one to a race of philosophers. Would we not judge that of
the philosophers to be best? Perhaps that would reflect our particular
cultural bias. Would we not accept as better a judgment which transcended
that bias? The answer between tigers and philosophers may be in doubt,
22. C. PEIRCE, VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE (P. Wiener ed. 1958); Peirce,
The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., NORTH ABIERICAN REv., Oct. 1871, at 455.
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but the question is not senseless. The answer is in doubt because a reason-
able man's preference may be in doubt. But starting from where we are, if
there is convergence from where we are, should we not be prepared to fol-
low that path? It does not seem to me that this empirical question of
whether there is to be ultimate convergence of opinion on the normative
need greatly influence our judgments of policy. For right now we do believe
certain things, such as the equality of rights, the happiness of mankind as a
test for policy, and the validity of the claims of justice, and we can proceed
from these beliefs on the presumption that we are judging not in our indi-
vidual personal interests, but as rational moral men. This is not a circular
argument because we have very definite ideas as to what it is to be moral.
We also have modes of inquiry on the basis of which we may come to
change those ideas as we gain new experience and insight.
The Peircian notion that there is a normative truth to which reasonable
moral men would eventually come if they considered the matter carefully
and thought clearly is nothing other than Washington's standard to which
the brave and honest can repair, a standard that appeals to what is right
against what is popular. This is also the essence of the argument for public
television. It is a claim of a present minority in behalf of a future majority.
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE HUMANIST CRITERION
We are now in a position to specify the positive criterion of serving the
public interest. First, however, let me offer some statements of verbal equiv-
alence. "Serves the public interest" may be defined, as "serves the general
welfare," or "advances the general good" or "is to the net benefit of the
public," and so may be recognized as a thoroughly normative expression.
Like all normatives it serves as a link between what is rightly to be done
and what is the case. Consequently, viewed from the descriptive side, it ap-
pears to be normative, and viewed from the normative side, it appears to
be descriptive, once our normative commitments are recognized.
If we are asking the normative question what we, as a social body, should
do, we may look to the public interest to furnish a ]ink to the positive, even
though "serves the public interest" is, as generally used, itself a normative
term. For it, in turn, has descriptive criteria, embodying our normative
commitments.
I propose that we consider for acceptance as consistent with our norma-
tive commitments the following pair of specifications or definitions2:
If A serves the public interest, A should be done.
A serves the public interest if it has certain positive characteristics, B.
I shall assume without further argument that we accept the first of these
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specifications, and that the only question worth discussing is what character-
istic, B, of an Act, A, justifies the judgment that A serves the public interest.
In short, how shall we specify (define2) "serves the public interest?"
We might do worse than to follow Bentham and say "A serves the public
interest if A best serves the happiness of all concerned." But the right-hand
side of this expression may be regarded as too highly tinged with the norma-
tive to be operational. We may specify, as a more clearly operational cri-
terion, that A serves the public interest if a certain sort of man who had to
take an equal chance of being anyone concerned would rather be in the
state of the world consequent on A than in any other state consequent on
any alternative in view. This criterion we may briefly refer to as the
Humanist Criterion. By this device we can specify the normative expres-
sion "serves the public interest" in terms of a positive expression "satisfies
the Humanist Criterion."
The Humanist Criterion, as proposed, is positive because it depends only
on the potentially "revealed" preference of a particular sort of man from
among specified states of the world. We may then specify the characteristics
of the test-man in whatever detail is required for our normative purposes
to be satisfied. Thus, to transcend cultural bias we require that he be a
reasonable man perfectly informed as to what it is like to live in any one of
a number of different cultures. To transcend personal bias he must also be
perfectly well informed as to the nature of different human temperaments,
because in making his decision he is presumed to face with equal probability
the chance that he might be anyone in the community affected by the
action contemplated. In taking anyone's place he is presumed to take that
place not with his own congenital nature and acquired preferences, but
those of the person whose place he takes. The device is an analytic device
only, but its intent and workings should be clear. It reduces the notion of
"serves the public interest" to a matter of human preference, and so permits
us to work out a positive criterion for that normative notion.
Our defense of the Humanist Criterion must be along the same lines
as Bentham's defense of the principle of utility. We must ask anyone who
doubts the Criterion whether he would not, upon fuller consideration, use
it as the test of serving the public interest. Ethical inquiry in general, and
policy inquiry in particular, is essentially an exploration of our commit-
ments. The Humanist Criterion implies that we are committed to the prin-
ciple that human institutions are to serve human welfare. Our randomiza-
tion of the test-man over all concerned with equal probability of being any-
one affected is an embodiment in the test of our commitment to the prin-
ciple that all men are to get equal consideration. In general, as we recog-
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nize our normative commitments we can usually impose corresponding con-
straints on the Humanist Criterion so that it will remain the positive specifi-
cation of our normative commitments to the public interest.
There is an objection to the Humanist Criterion that is so clearly beside
the point that I would hesitate to mention it if it had not been repeatedly
raised by some of my most distinguished colleagues. That objection is that
there is no such person as our test-man. The positive content of this objec-
tion is undoubtedly true. No perfectly informed man exists. Does that
render conceptually non-operational what was advanced as an operational
condition? I did not specify that the test-man was to be existent. This
whole device is only to clarify what we are talking about when we say
better or worse. A conceivable though non-existent test-man is enough for
such clarification. Even though we do not know what a perfectly informed
man woud prefer, that concept is enough to guide our inquiry aimed at im-
proving that knowledge.
Schubert found three different views of the public interest current in the
literature of political science, which he called rationalist, idealist, and realist
respectively.23 The differences can be briefly characterized by the definition
of the public interest that each would propose. The rationalists, who regard
the voice of the people as the voice of God would propose the definition
"A is in the public interest if it is desired by a majority of the people." The
idealists would advance the definition, "A is in the public interest if A is
good for the public." The realists would offer the definition that "A is in
the public interest if it is the outcome of the appropriate political process."
I cannot go into the relative merits of these viewpoints, other than briefly
to state, rather than to defend, the reasons why I find the so-called rational-
ist and realist positions untenable. The defense of the "idealist" point of
view is, of course, the subject of this paper up to this point, although I
would not call it idealist.
It is not clear whether the proposed definitions should be taken as defini-
tions, or definitions2. If they were offered as definitions1, I would simply
say of the rationalist and realist proposals, "that's not what we mean by th4
public interest." To accept either one of them as a verbal equivalent of
"public interest" would be to commit the so-called naturalistic fallacy.
Whether that is a fallacy or not, the argument against defining1 a normative
term, like the public interest, in positive terms would apply to the rationalist
and realist proposals.
If, alternatively, the rationalist and realist proposals are interpreted as
specifications, they must be rejected on normative grounds. The majority
23. G. SCHUBERT, supra note 11, passim.
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may want something that is not good for the public at large, and so contrary
to the public interest. Similarly, what comes out of the political process
may not be in the public interest, it may simply not serve the public welfare.
The realist specification is like specifying a good apple as one purchased
from grocer Brown. He may sell you, on the average, the best apples you
can get, but he may sometimes sell you a bad apple. What comes out of
the political process is legally binding, and presumably the best we can do,
but it need not be in the public interest.
After the most exhaustive study of the concept of the public interest
known to me, Schubert concluded that
... our investigation has failed to reveal a statement of public interest
theory that offers much promise either as a guide to public officials
who are supposed to make decisions in the public interest or to research
scholars who might wish to investigate the extent to which govern-
mental decisions are empirically made in the public interest. For
either of the latter purposes, it woud be necessary to have operational
definitions of the public interest concept; and neither my analysis nor
that of other contemporary critics suggest that the public interest
theory prevalent in America today either is or is readily capable of
being made operational. 4
The Humanist Criterion is proposed to meet this requirement of opera-
tionality. But it is not so new that Schubert could not find earlier examples
of the "idealist" viewpoint that could offer an operational specification of
the public interest.
But what does idealism have to offer, other than moralistic exhorta-
tions to do good? It leaves the decision-maker to rely upon his own
best lights, whether these are conceived of as a Platonic soul, a Calvin-
istic conscience, or as Catholic natural law. It may be that any one of
these provides the best standards available for guiding some decision-
makers in some situations; but labeling as "the public interest" either
such a process or the result that it produces adds nothing to what we
would have--except from the point of view of the engineering of
consent-if there were no such phrase as public interest. With or with-
out the label we must rely upon the prior political socialization and the
ethical preconditioning of the individual decision-maker for whatever
kind or degree of responsibility that ensues in such circumstances. 5
There is a confusion here. What is to be expected from a label? It should
certainly surprise no one that a label cannot provide the basis for a substan-
tive judgment of policy. The label "serves the public interest" cannot do
24. Id, at 220.
25. Id. at 221.
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anything for us, but the specification of "serves the public interest" as
"satisfies the Humanist Criterion" can do a great deal for us. What it can
do for us is the job that normative judgments normally do. They connect
something that is rightly to be done with the criteria for its rightly being
done. It would certainly be odd if a concept like the public interest which
is so liberally sprinkled through our political discourse should have no func-
tion to perform. The function it has to perform is the function of a norma-
tive term: to state that something is to be done because something is the
case. More precisely, as we are construing the expression "is in the public
interest," it says that a favorable normative quality adheres to a particular
situation by virtue of that situation having cerain descriptive qualities. The
normative quality is that of being in the public interest. That is associated
with, but by no means the same as, the normative concept "should be
done." The association is through a normative judgment, in this case a
specification of one normative in terms of another, that whatever is, on net
balance, in the public interest should be done. The normative notion of the
public interest is also associated with a descriptive quality or criterion, for
which I have been nominating the Humanist Criterion, such that some-
thing serves the public interest if it meets that criterion.
More serious than the confusion over the difference between the function
of a label and of a normative concept is the assumption that in order to
determine what is right a man must rely upon his own best lights. Why not
our best lights? My earlier arguments against personalism, whether right
or wrong, were certainly not beside the point. Is the Humanist Criterion
merely my best light, or is there not some reason to judge that it should be
acceptable (possibly with further qualifications) to any reasonable moral
man? The political scientist's rejection of the so-called idealist concept of
the public interest proceeds both from positivist epistemology and from the
doctrine of personalism of the normative. If the Humanist Criterion, or
anything like it, is accepted, the concept of the public interest is given opera-
tional significance, not by its verbal definition, but by its specification.
V. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PUBLIC TELEVISION
But to others in parables; that seeing
they might not see and hearing they
might not understand.
Luke 8:10
Would a reasonable man, perfectly informed about the alternatives,
and randomized over all concerned, rather live in a state of the world
in which there was public television, or one in which there was available
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$1.15 more per capita to be spent annually on consumption or investment?
If he would prefer the former, our argument runs, public television is in
the public interest.
From this point on, our problem is not with the normative but with the
positive, and we must face our real difficulty-our ignorance of the facts.
We don't know how public television would work in our political and social
framework, nor how television programs affect us, nor what a well in-
formed man would prefer. These are matters of fact in the behavioral
sciences, so our real trouble with the normative turns out to be our ignor-
ance of the positive. Once again we must have recourse to judgment, but
this time we need judgment of what is rather than of what ought to be.
The facts that, if they were facts, would support the argument for pub-
lic television may be simply stated. First, television can do great things.
Second, our present system of commercial television is not achieving that
potentiality. Third, a publicly supported television system, properly insu-
lated from governmental interference, could more nearly achieve that po-
tential.
The great things that television can achieve are not limited to the pro-
vision of better information, though that is certainly one important oppor-
tunity for improvement. Commercial network television already does a
truly remarkable job in bringing important events into the homes of the
American people with a vividness unmatched in history. But, great as are
the feats of the network news and public affairs programs, which take us
into the very foxholes of Vietnam, there remains a gap between seeing
something and understanding it. And commercial television has not, in
the opinion of men expert in this field, bridged that gap as well as it can
be done. Sometimes it does, and so reveals how much remains to be done.
The principal complaint of those involved in the production of news
and public affairs programs for commercial television is the timidity im-
posed by the ownership of the television networks It will be interesting
to see whether public television can escape that timidity. It is said that
nothing is so timid as a million dollars, but I would guess that a bureaucrat
dependent on a Congressional appropriation can offer a million dollars a
lesson in timidity. How far a Public Television Corporation can be insu-
lated from this timidity is a question of fact for political science. The best
way to find out is to try.
26, See, e.g., ,Murrow, Address to the Radio and Television News Directors' Associa-
tion Convention, in H. SKORMIA, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY 227-38 (1965), or the testi-
mony of Fred Friendly, almost anywhere.
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Next to timidity, the biggest subject of complaint from the public affairs
fraternity in television is the limited amount of broadcast time allocated
to their programs. Here we should expect Public Television to do better.
Broadcast time is so valuable in dollars and cents to commercial television
that not much can be spared for treatment of the news in depth. On the
other hand, at those local stations where more time can be spared, the
broadcasts are given such meager support that the time is wasted. An extra
half hour of news bulletins off the wire read from an invisible projector
by a personable announcer is of rather dubious value, other than to afford
an opportunity to hear the news at a time different from that of the regu-
lar network broadcast, an opportunity usually available over radio in any
case. The networks spend large amounts of money on news and public
affairs, but accord it limited broadcast time. The local stations that grant
it more time begrudge it the money.
Ideally, Public Television could be expected to devote a great deal of
broadcast time to public affairs programs that will furnish the basis of a
deeper understanding of our world. When I say it could be expected, I
mean if, by some miracle of political science, it were run by a responsible
management free to program the way it thought most in the public interest.
If, however, the institutional arrangements are such that an appropriate
deference to the sensitivity of Congress is required, all bets are off. It is
one of the greatest threats to Public Television that what is good is not
likely to be welcomed by important sectors of our governmental establish-
ment, or by influential groups outside of government. This is, in my opin-
ion, likely to furnish a counter-example to the "realist" viewpoint that
whatever comes out of the process of government is in the public interest.
There is no reason to expect a high degree of congruence between the sen-
sitivities and values of Congressmen, bureaucrats, or interest groups, and
what is in the public interest in public television programming.
In any case, the need for programming in news and public affairs dif-
ferent from what now appears on the commercial networks is partly the
result of spectrum limitation. Because the spectrum is limited, there is
simply not enough opportunity, after more lucrative entertainment de-
mands are met, for the extensive treatment of our public problems that
those problems deserve.
But it is not only the limitation of time that blocks the way to under-
standing. The pressure common to all commercial journalism to deliver
that which titillates rather than that which illuminates is also felt in tele-
vision, though somewhat more successfully resisted there than elsewhere.
The great opportunity for Public Television in public affairs programming,
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if it is not inhibited by bureaucratic timidity, is the achievement of deeper
understanding on the part of the viewer. The information communicated
by the extensive news coverage of the networks, vivid and concrete as it
is, very seldom generates understanding. Sometimes it does and it is won-
derful to experience, but not nearly as often as it could if that were more
clearly recognized as the object of the game.
There is a bias imposed on the marketing of news in this country by the
necessity of selling the carrying medium, whether it be a newspaper or a
commercial program. Consequently, there is a premium for any reporter
to make a great scoop, to provoke an incident, or to capitalize on an inci-
dent provoked by others, in order to provide excitement. The need to ex-
cite gets in the way of the need to inform. Reporters who are skillful in
digging up and creating a good story should not be expected to be profound
analysts of what is happening.
For news reporters, in general, to develop understanding in the Ameri-
can public would be for water to run uphill. When, for example, Krush-
chev visited the United States and submitted to questions at the Overseas
Press Club, the questioning reporters, instead of trying to elicit from him
answers that would illuminate the problems of Soviet-American relation-
ships, tried the impossible, to embarrass Krushchev. They failed to do so,
and even more seriously they failed to seize an opportunity to create for
the American public a television program of transcendent importance for
developing an understanding of a crucial problem.
This should not be taken as a personal criticism of the fine men who
are American news reporters. They too are responding to the demands of
their environment. Understanding does not make headlines, and they are
dealers in headlines. But neither do headlines make for understanding.
So if it is the function of the American news media to make headlines, some
other agency is required to make for understanding. The fault lies with
us, the American public, in that we demand headlines rather than under-
standing, but we too are responding to our environment.
But it hardly pays to argue over who is at fault. The question is, what
is to be done about it? What is proposed is to construct an institutional
arrangement whose operating goal would be to generate understanding
rather than to make headlines and capitalize on them. It may very well
be that our society and our form of government is incapable of that task.
There may be no way to escape the fate of headline journalism. Our ex-
perience to date need not be conclusive, even though it is unequivocal. That
experience reflects the institutions so far used. Whether it is possible within
our political framework to give governmental support to a non-govern-
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mental agency dedicated to the development of understanding, rather than
of headlines, in its treatment of news and public affairs remains to be seen.
The proposal before us is designed to that end, and it is worth trying to
find out whether it can be done. Its failure would not necessarily prove
that it can't be done, but we certainly will never know whether it can be
done if we don't try. My own judgment, for what it is worth, is that it
hangs in a delicate balance, depending on the nature of the people who
come to manage the process and their skill in withstanding the onslaughts
of those powers and those interests that would destroy the freedom of pub-
lic television to do what it might and should do if it were only free.
Even in entertainment programs, especially in entertainment programs,
there are potentialities which are unrealized in commercial telvision, that
must remain unrealized so long as it is commercial. These potentialities
arise from the nature of art and the creative performance. Commercial
television, in meeting its commercial requirements, finds itself constrained
to produce that which pleases the majority and offends nobody, and this
is a completely different incentive from what has been found in art to be
the basis of great artistic performance: the will of the performer. We have
no formula by which great art can be produced to order; what has been
found most effective in the past is to give those who are driven by their own
compulsions to the production of great art the opportunity to do what they
feel compelled to do. This applies as much to public affairs programs as
to entertainment programs, and indeed we risk misconceiving the nature
and function of a program when we call it entertaimnent. It is entertain
ment from the point of view of the viewer, but art transforms us as it en-
tertains us. It enhances our experience and is itself a part of our experi-
ence. It helps make us what we are. So, while we may be impelled to
watch a television program by our desire to be entertaind, entertainment
does much more than give us pleasure. A program must hold our atten-
tion if it is to do anything to us at all, and whether it holds our attention
through entertainment or through excitement or edification is less impor-
tant than what becomes of us because of our experiencing the program.
Commercial television is reproached by its critics for not doing more to
make us as good men as we might be. The very words we use become so
distorted as to be misleading. The critics certainly do not mean that public
television should have the duty of making us obey the regnant sexual code
more faithfully. There is another and deeper meaning of a good man, one
capable of participating in the good life, and that is the sort of man which
television might help make. Nor do they mean, heaven forbid, that tele-
vision program producers should sanctimoniously strive to make better
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men of us. What a sorry mess that would be! They do mean that, in man-
ufacturing programs for the popular market, the producers are not letting
the best artists follow their own standards of what makes a good work of
art. And the effect of good works of art, they hold, is to make better men
of us; the effect of bad art is to degrade.
In Randall Jarrell's twist on Oscar Wilde's epigram, human nature
copies art, 7 and the art of the commercial television program is not a model
which we should prefer for human nature. The complaint of critics like
Jarrell is that while "Art lies to tell us the (sometimes disquieting) truth;
the Medium tells us truths, facts, in order to make us believe some reassur-
ring or entertaining lie or half truth."2 The main objection then to popu-
lar television programs from the point of view of their intrinsic artistic value
is that they transmit false values, values known by their authors to be false,
because they are found to be the values that will make the product sell.
It is this distinction between the true and the contrived that is most impor-
tant basis of adverse criticism of television production by the intellectual
critics.
Perhaps it is too much to ask that television make better men of us, but
we might hope for it to tend in that direction. Such a hope is currently
not as well realized as it might be, not for any lack of good will and moral
responsibility on the part of those in the television industry, for I think that
the moral responsibility and integrity of those in the television industry
will, in spite of the quiz scandals, stand comparison with those in any other
industry. The trouble is not that this is an immoral industry, but that it is
an industry, that it is the economics of advertising which provides the en-
vironmental stimulus to which television programming responds. If the
business and legal responsibility to the stockholder for making profit is set
on one side of the scale, and the moral responsibility to the public for great
art on the other, even though the responsibility to the public may be felt
more heavily in this industry than in any other, it must be outweighed by
commercial considerations. There is room for moral responsibility only
within the non-competitive interstices of the commercial television structure.
The commercial networks do sacrifice each year, in their public affairs pro-
gramming, millions of dollars of potential profits to their moral standards of
responsibility. Some may view this cynically, or as they would say, realisti-
cally, as the tribute the networks pay, on behalf of their owned and affiliated
stations, to the responsibility for serving the public interest that is the legal
presumption of the station licenses, a long-run cost of maintaining their
27. Jarrell, A Sad Heart at the Supermarket, DAEDALUS, Spring 1960, at 366.
28. Id. at 368.
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favored positions. But such, in my judgment, is not the case, or, at least,
not the whole story. I think that the good opinion of the community, and
more especially of the elite of the community, as well as their own integrity,
is highly valued by those who govern the network treatment of news and
public affairs, so that the extra expenditures for high-quality programming
are made in spite of the profit motive rather than from the profit motive.
The desire for programming distinction has become a motive alongside
the profit motive, so that there will be some tradeoff between the quest
for distinction and the quest for profits, not only in news and public affairs
but in entertainment programming as well. But, granting all this, the quest
for profits is dominant. It is only within the extra freedom afforded by its
higher-than-normal profitability that television can afford to trade profits
for distinction. The higher profitability results partly from spectrum limi-
tations, and the consequently restricted numbers of competing stations. It
partly also proceeds from the pattern of audience flows. It is more profit-
able to place a new program, whatever it may be, on a network which
leads in the ratings than on a network that is behind. There is a certain
inertia of the public in tending to leave the dial turned to the station to
which it was last tuned unless there is a positive reason for switching. There
is indeed a great deal of switching, but nevertheless there is a certain resid-
ual probability of a higher rating for a given program if it follows a popu-
lar program than if it follows an unpopular one. It is for this reason that
a low-audience public affairs program may be costly not only in failing
to get full sponsorship, but also in endangering the sponsorship of adjacent
programs. This "Dustman Doolittle" theory that morality is a luxury good
might be given an empirical test by a comparison of the revealed moral
standards in the programming of the third network as compared with the
first.
We, the American people, are in a poor position to reproach the tele-
vision industry for the immorality of giving us what we want. There is,
however, another reason why, if commercial television does not program
in the public interest, we should reproach ourselves and not those in the
industry. It is up to us to structure our institutions so that they work in the
public interest even if we depend on private interests to serve that end. As
Adam Smith observed long ago, one need not pay much attention to the
claims of businessmen that they trade in the public interest.
Television programming is mass culture, designed to please majority
tastes rather than to realize what the artist feels is best. What is wrong
with mass culture? When Dorothy Parker prefers a positive Wasserman
test to a poem by Eddy Guest, is that simply snobbery? Undoubtedly snob-
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bery plays a part in the complaints of the long-haired intellectuals against
the mass media, but we must not fall into the genetic fallacy. There may
be something in the complaint, whatever its motive. The principal short-
coming of a work that is produced to meet a market requirement is that it
is likely to lack sincerity, and those critics who turn most strongly against
mass culture object principally to the insincerity of the product. They dis-
tinguish between popular art and folk art largely on this basis.
Sincerity has long been recognized as a fundamental characteristic of a
great work of art." The power of an artist derives from his ability to com-
municate more than he can understand, and if he produces a product for
market, he loses that power, as Robert Sherwood demonstrated when he
wrote for television. In one sense, an artist cannot produce for the market,
for then he ceases to be an artist and becomes a manufacturer, a producer.
And this is not a tautology, but the entailment of a substantive specifica-
tion of the nature of true art.
Dwight McDonald claims that "there are theoretical reasons why mass
culture is not and can never be any good."3 Culture, he claims, can only
be produced by and for human beings and the mass is not a human being.
This argument I take to be nonsense. Popular television programs are pro-
duced for beings that are all too human. The trouble is that they are being
used as human beings. McDonald comes closer to the point when he com-
plains that the "technicians of our mass culture" treat people as things just
as do the "questionnaire-sociologists" and other social scientists. They vio-
late Kant's categorical imperative in its second form, in which it commands
us to treat people as ends and not means. But, as a social scientist, however
heretical, I must object to putting manipulation and investigation on the
same moral plane. And even the manipulation has the defense of con-
sumer sovereignty; it is demanded by the subject, not imposed upon him.
The charge against mass culture in general, and commercial television in
particular then comes down to this: it is wrong to give the public what it
wants if what the public wants is not good for it, and if you give the public
what it wants rather than what you believe in, that is not likely to be good
for the public.
James Baldwin claims that the only method by which the mind can be
improved is by disturbing the peace. 1 And, clearly the man who wants
the greatest possible audience is not interested in disturbing the peace.
29. See in particular Tolstoy, What is Art?, in AESTHETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CRITICISM (M. Levich ed. 1963).
30. McDonald, A Theory of Mass Culture, DIOGENES, Summer 1953, at 1-17, re-
printed in B. ROSENBERG & D. WHITE, MASS CULTURE 59-73 (1957).
31. Baldwin, Mass Culture and the Creative Artist, DAEDALUS, Spring 1960, at 374.
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Baldwin's complaint that the "movies are designed not to trouble, but to
reassure; they do not reflect reality, they merely rearrange its elements into
something we can bear. They also weaken our ability to deal with the world
as it is, ourselves as we are,"' 2 may be misplaced, even if the media do what
he says they do. We clearly do not really know the relationship of the con-
tent of a piece of literature to its effect on our lives. It appears to the seri-
ous artist that escapist literature, literature that transforms reality so that it
is more bearable, is in some sense a weakening of the moral fiber or at least
tends to deteriorate the quality of life. But anesthesia is not always with-
out value. Possibly life as it is is too horrible to contemplate and a literature
which transforms it into something that seems more pleasant may have a
function. If the role of popular art is to confirm and validate values, and
the role of high art is to disturb, challenge and transform values, there may
be a place for each. For most of the time on commercial television and for
much of the time on public television it would seem to be appropriate to
confirm the existing values. But some of the time it is valuable to challenge
them and to help transform them. It is that process which disturbs the
peace, and a disturbance of the peace is not welcome on commercial tele-
vision. How welcome it will be on Public Television is an important ques-
tion. I can hardly believe that Congress will willingly support an institu-
tion that, either in news and public affairs or in entertainment programs,
seriously challenges generaly accepted values. The problem may be too
deep for remedy within our institutional arrangements. The Philistines may
so constrain Public Television as to defeat that true art that upsets the
viewer to his advantage. This is a dangerous business. Whether it can be
done or not is a matter of fact which nobody can estimate reliably. The
best we can do is try and see, even though the odds are against the maker.
If, then, excellence rather than acceptability is a worthy ideal for tele-
vision, may it not be an ideal for our other activities as well? As the per-
ceptive reader may well have suspected, I am after bigger game than public
television. In all social policy, is it not excellence that is to be achieved
rather than want satisfaction? Is it only in television that we should raise
a standard to which the wise and honest can repair?
32. Id. at 375.
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